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)
)
)
)
)

(
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)
)
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)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs-Appellants, herein referred to as
plaintiffs, filed an action in the District Court for a
Declaratory Judgment seeking a ruling from the Court that they
were entitled to cross Defendant-Respondent, herein referred
to as defendant's property in order to reach property then
owned by the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs further sought a

permanent restraining order preventing the defendant from
barracading or interferring with plaintiff's access.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence, defendant
moved to dismiss plaintiffs' Complaint.

The Court took the

motion under advisement and after defendant presented his
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- 2 evidence, the Court granted defendant's motion to dismiss.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs on appeal seek reversal of the trial
court's decision and a permanent restraining order preventing
the defendant from interfering with plaintiffs' access across
defendant's property to allow plaintiffs access to their
forty acre parcel,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
All of the plaintiffs are owners of a parcel of
real property located in Summit County within Section 34,
Township 1 North, Range 7 East.

The plaintiffs George Q.

Nielsen and Sherry Nielsen acquired title to their property
from Ethel Gibbons by Warranty Deed in 1962.

The other

plaintiffs acquired title by conveyance from George Q. Nielsen
and Sherry Nielsen.

The ownership of the property was

stipulated by counsel (T.3, 63).
Ethel Gibbons and her family owned the property for
a long period of time.

Alma Gibbons was deeded the property

by the State of Utah in 1914, (plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 9 ) .
The property was deeded subject to any easement or right of
way of the public, even at that time.
Ethel Gibbons acquired the property from her family
in 1935, and continued ownership until 1962, when she conveyed
the property to George Q. Nielsen.

During her lifetime, the
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- 3 only means of getting to the property was over what she and
her family had called "Shingle Mill Canyon Road".
(T-63).

(R-ll),

For a period of over forty years, she and her family

used the roadway to the property as a matter of right.

(R-ll).

In 1938, Virgil Smith, a resident of Summit County,
used the property for logging and used an established roadway
across the Curt Wilde property to remove the logs.
later became the grantor of the defendant herein.

Curt Wilde
(R-13).

The Pines Ranch originally consisted of 160 acres,
four 40-acre parcels.

They were acquired from the original

homesteader, a Mr. Pyrie.

They ran in an east-west direction,

parallel to the river and the roadway. (T-81).
Thereafter, the defendant acquired three more 40-acre
parcels along the west fence line and an additional 40-acre
parcel from Curt Wilde.
1964.

These purchases were made in 1961, and

(T83 and T102-103).
George Q. Nielsen purchased the 40-acre parcel in

question from Ethel Gibbons in 1962, and used the roadway to
reach his property.

(T-9)

He used the property for logging,

recreation, removal of Christmas trees, hiking, etc.
Subsequently in 1964, the defendant purchased one more
40-acre parcel from the Gibbons estate headed by Albert Gibbons.
This transaction gave the defendant ownership of all of Section 34,
with the exception of that property owned by the plaintiffs herein.
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- 4 Shortly before this lawsuit was filed, the defendant
began interfering with plaintiffs1 access to the property,
and the plaintiffs filed this action for declaratory judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT USE OF THE RIGHT
OF WAY BY THE PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS WAS
PERMISSIVE,
The clear and undisputed testimony is that the plaintiffs,
their predecessors, and other persons used the contested right of way
for nearly a half century, commencing in 1938.

(Rll-13).

The defendant acquired the property surrounding the
property of the plaintiff, from Mr. Curt Wilde.

Mr. Rogerson

testified that he believed the purchase was made in 1957.

(T-83)

But on the cross examination he identified the deed from Mr. Curt
Wilde to Pines Ranch, dated September 7, 1961.
the last 4 0 acre

(T102-103).

And

parcel was purchased by the defendants from the

Gibbons estate in 1964.

(T-83).

The Court found that in "recent years" the use by the
plaintiffs became permissive because defendant has made every"
attempt to keep people from trespassing.

(R-32, paragraph 2 ) •

In Utah, the period of time required to acquire a
prescriptive right is twenty (20) years, so said this Court in
Cassity v. Castigano, 10 Utah 2d 16, 347 P. 2d 834.

That

principle is so clearly established that it does not deserve
further attention here.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 5 It is clear that the prescriptive rights were
established very early by the plaintiffs1 predecessor in
interest, Ethel Gibbons.

Any permissiveness on the part of

defendant in recent years would not affect or upset prescriptive rights already acquired by the plaintiffs or their
predecessors in interest.

(See Zollinger v. Frank, 110 Utah 514,

175 P. 2d 714.)
The plaintiffs believe the instant situation is governed
by this Court's decision in Richins v. Struhs, 17 Utah 2d 356, 412
P. 2d 314, where the Court speaking of the fundamental principles
applicable to prescriptive rights, said:
"The origin and purpose of their recognition arises out
of the general policy of the law of assuring the peace
and good order of society by leaving a long established
status quo at rest rather than by disturbing it.
In order to serve this purpose, when a claimant has
shown that such a use has existed peaceably and without
interference for the prescriptive period of 20 years,
the law presumes that the use is adverse to the owner;
and that it had a legitimate origin. The latter
presumption is usually placed on the ground that there
was a lawful grant of such right, but that it had been
lost. It is appreciated that this lost grant theory is
fictional. But the theory upon which the presumption
rests is not important. Whatever theory it may be based
based upon, what is significant is that it has a well
justified and salutary purpose which is in conformity
with the policy just discussed; and that it is so well
established in our law that its validity is no longer
open to question. Consequently it should be given
effect to prevent the very thing which defendants have
attempted here; the upsetting of a situation which has
existed amicably since "the memory of man runneth not
to the contrary."
(emphasis added)
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- 6 The Court further made clear the burden of the parties
in this kind of case.

Where the claimant has shown that such

use has existed peaceably and without interference for twenty
(20) years, the law presumes that its use is adverse to the
owner and that it had a legitimate origin.

The plaintiffs

herein have clearly shown the use commencing in 1935, without
any interference whatever until the time this lawsuit was
commenced, and the defendant herein had no standing to complain
about crossing the Curt Wilde property until 1961, when the
Wilde property was acquired by them.
The Court in Richins also stated,
"The presumption above mentioned that a use is
adverse which arises from its continuance for a
long period of time is not absolute. It would
not preclude the owner of the servient estate,
(defendant herein), from proving that the use
was by permission. If he sustains that burden
and overcomes the presumption of proof that the
use was initially permissive, then the burden
of going forward with the evidence and of
ultimate persuasion shifts back to the claimant
to show that the use became adverse and continued
for the prescriptive period."
The Court made clear that the reason for this rule was
to insure that a claimant would not "sneak up" on the owner
by using his property under permission and thereafter claim the
use as a matter of right.

It is abundantly clear in this

situation that the initial use and continued use from the date
Ethel Gibbons acquired the property in 19 35, and until this action
was filed in 1974, that the use was claimed as a matter of right
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- 7 and certainly could not have been permissive with the defendant
herein because defendant had no ownership interest until 1961.
The record is replete with evidence and admissions
by the defendants witnesses that the roadway was used by Curt
Wilde, by the Stevens and other people, and there is absolutely
no evidence in the record that anyone was ever denied access
across defendant's property until the neighbors started subdividing their property.

Counsel for the defendant asked

Rogerson on direct examination whether or not prior to 1964
or 1965,

they had "no trespassing" signs posted on their

gate, to which he responded, "I don't remember specifically".
(T-92)
The only direct evidence of blocking out the plaintiffs,
or other persons, was made by one of the defense witnesses,
Scott M. Matheson, who testified very precisely that he acquired
some of the real property on June 22, 1971. (T-66).

And he

installed a chain and padlock over the roadway in question on
the 4th day of October, 1975.

(T-69).

Until that time there

is no evidence that the plaintiffs were deprived access to the
property, and there is no evidence, with the exception of the
short statement by Mr. Rogerson, that sometime in 1962, 1963,
or 1965, he told the plaintiff Mr. Nielsen that he was trespassing
on the property, while cutting Christmas trees.
conversation was denied by Mr. Nielsen.

(T-117).
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(T-109).

The

- 8 Mr. Rogerson admitted at trial that Albert Gibbons,
his grantor, used the property for lumbering, and took the
lumber down the Wilde road.

(T-105)

The clear and undisputed testimony is that the plaintiffs
and their predecessors and other persons used the contested
right of way for nearly half a century, commencing in 1938.

(Rll-13).

This use obviously occurred before the defendant even acquired the
Curt Wilde property, which was the property over which the plaintiffs
and their predecessors traversed.

The Curt Wilde property was not

purchased until 1961, and the last 40 acre parcel was acquired from
the Gibbons estate in 1964.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE USE BY THE
PLAINTIFFS TO BE TOO SPORADIC TO ESTABLISH
PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHTS.
The trial court found that the plaintiffs and their
predecessors had used the property sporadically and said use
had not been sufficient to require the Court to find that
the plaintiffs or their predecessors had established an easement.
(R-32).
Unfortunately, the courts have not stated with precision
the amount of use required to establish the prescriptive rights,
but it appears clear that the legislature addressed itself to that
question relative to adverse possession by persons claiming title
under written instrument.

UCA 78-12-9 provides,

"For the purpose of constituting an adverse
possession by any person claiming a title
founded upon a written instrument or a
the Howard W. land
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judgmentDigitized
or by
decree,
is
deemed
to Law
have
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 9 been possessed and occupied in the following
case: ... (3) where, although not inclosed,
it has been used for the supply of fuel, or of
fencing timber for the purpose of husbandry, or
for pasturage, or for the ordinary use of the
occupant."...
The "ordinary use of the occupant" is dictated by
the nature of the land and the desires of the occupant.
Cooper v. Carter Oil Company,

In

7 Utah 2d 9, 316 P. 2d 320, the

court found adverse possession where the open, notorious and
continuous use of the property consisted of grazing sheep upon
the land for only three weeks out of the year.
The property in question here was utilized for the
"ordinary use" of persons who owned this kind of land.

Accord-

ing to the affidavit of Ethel Gibbons, (R-ll) , it was used for
harvesting timber, grazing sheep, picnicking and other purposes.
The affidavit of James Smith, (R-13) , indicates it was utilized
for securing logs for building his home.

It is evident from

the plaintiffs1 Exhibits 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, that the roadway was
utilized often enough that it is plainly visible deep into the
property, even in August, 1972, when photographs were taken.

(T45)

The very nature of the land would limit, somewhat, its
use.

There were no highways to it, it was recreational land,

but it was used by Mr. Nielson for horseback riding, cutting timber,
taking out Christmas trees. (T-12).

Relatives of Ethel Gibbons had

used it for harvesting the Christmas trees.

(T-54)

and his friends used it for hunting grouse.

(T-62).
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And Mr. Nielsen
Admittedly

- 10 the use of the property was not great because of the very
nature of the property itself.
However, the aerial photograph, (plaintiffs1 Exhibit No. 1 ) ,
taken in 1952, shows the road very clearly indicating substantial use of the access road across what is now the Pine Ranch
property.

At the time the photograph was taken, of course, the

defendant was not the owner of the property.

That portion

designated as "Stevens Property" was owned by the Stevens, as it
is today.

The portion across the fence was owned by Curt Wilde.

Mr. Rogerson, the chief defense witness, admitted that Mr. Wilde
took timber from the property, that he improved the road and
constructed a loading facility for removing timber.

(T-84).

But he stated that the roadway did not go to the Ethel Gibbons
property.

It was short by at least 100 yards, although admitted

that there were indications of animal traffic to the plaintiff's
property.

(T-85).
POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CASE
OF RICHINS V. STRUHS WAS NOT APPLICABLE.
The facts in the Richins case, supra, are remarkably
similar to the present case.

In both cases, peaceable use of

the easement had continued for nearly half a century.

In both

cases the use had been begun by predecessors to the present
parties in interest.

In both cases, the defendants erected a fence

to interfere with the plaintiffs1 access to their property.

In

both cases, defendants asserted permissiveness in recent years
the Howard
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- 11 cases, the testimony as to use by the plaintiffs was undisputed,
and finally, in both cases, the defendant's erected a fence to
prevent access to the property.
The principles enunciated in Richins should be applied
to the case now before the Court.

The fundamental philosophy

of Richins is as applicable and pertinent here as it is in the
Richins case itself.

The evidence shows that the use has existed

peaceably without interference for the prescriptive period of
twenty years.

The law presumes that the use was adverse to the

owner, and it had a legitimate origin.

There is no evidence

to the contrary and no logical reason whatever to deny application
of the principles in Richins to this case.
POINT IV
TO DENY PLAINTIFFS ACCESS TO THEIR LAND RENDERS
THE PROPERTY WORTHLESS TO PLAINTIFFS.
The past use of the property has been consistent with
its mountainous terrain and character.

It has been used for

logging, Christmas tree harvesting, hunting, prospecting,
herding sheep and recreational purposes.
The defendant initially owned only four 40-acre parcels
in Section 34, but gradually increased their holdings by
purchasing additional property.

They purchased the Curt Wilde

property in 1961, which was the property over which the plaintiffs
had traversed to gain access to their property, and in 1964,
purchased additional property from the Gibbons estate and thereby
completely surrounded and isolated the plaintiffs1 property.
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- 12 In the event this court sustains the trial court's
judgment it means, in effect, that the plaintiffs' property is
totally inaccessible and is worthless to the owners.

It amounts

to a forfeiture to the defendants, who, incidentally, have
utilized the property for their own purposes by allowing livestock to graze upon it.

(T-108)

To deny plaintiffs access is in effect to grant to the
defendant the plaintiffs' 40-acre parcel of property.

The

nature, character and use of the property is identical.

If the

plaintiffs are isolated and cannot gain access, it amounts to
a grant of plaintiffs' property to the defendant.
It is interesting to note in the testimony of Mr. Rogerson,
that at the time the defendant acquired the property, there
was already a steel post fence running along the north boundary
of plaintiffs' property and what is now the south boundary of the
defendant's property.

(T-91-92).

Mr. Rogerson also testified that

they, the defendants, installed a gate on the plaintiffs' property
because their horses would get upon the plaintiffs' property and
they had to have a convenient way to get them back.

(T-108)

But

when the Gibbons' sheep strayed off what is now the plaintiffs'
property onto the defendant's property to get water, the defendant
brought legal action against them.

(T-105).

It is obvious that the

defendant herein has taken every advantage for itself, to the
detriment of the plaintiffs.

No one can logically deny the existence
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- 13 of the roadway across what was the Curt Wilde property into
the area now owned by the plaintiffs.
and conclusive.

The evidence is clear

The defendants embarked upon a course of

gradually purchasing all of the property to surround that now
owned by the plaintiffs.
The

very attitude of the defendants herein is to

take all they can take, giving nothing in return.
The judgment of the district court, if allowed to stand
would be the "icing on the cake", granting to the defendant an
additional 40 acre parcel of property which cost the plaintiffs
$8,000.00 (Eight thousand dollars).

(T-21).

This is a windfall

to which the defendants are not entitled, and a detriment or loss
to the plaintiffs that they do not deserve.

This is particularly

true, where a continued use of the roadway would not constitute
any substantial damage to the defendants.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs1 predecessor, Ethel Gibbons, has
utilized the access roadway to her property in excess of forty
(4 0) years.

The defendants did not even acquire the property

on the west to thereby isolate the plaintiffs1 property until
1961, although there was some testimony that Mr. Rogerson
believed the land was purchased in 1957.

The roadway in

question had been used by many people other than the plaintiffs
and their predecessors without objection, and without interruption.
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- 14 Stevens used it for securing his water, cattlemen used it
for transporting cattle, and it was used for harvesting timber,
and there is absolutely no evidence that it was used by the
permission of the defendants.

The defendants had no right to

grant or withhold permission until 1961.
right over the plaintiffs and all others.

They now assert that
It is clear that the

time required to acquire a prescriptive right in this state is
twenty (20) years, and that right was acquired by Ethel Gibbons
by 1955.

The use by her and her successors in interest was con-

sistent with the nature and use of the property itself and in fact,
is the very use of the property today.

True, the use was sporadic,

but that is consistent with the nature of the land and the logical
use by any occupant.
All of the criteria

laid down by this Court in

acquiring prescriptive rights have been met by the plaintiffs
herein.

There is no evidence of permission given by the defendants

herein, and the plaintiffs are therefore entitled to the presumptions enumerated in Richins.
To hold otherwise will upset the situation which has existed
amicably for nearly five decades and would amount to a taking of
the property of the plaintiffs without compensation, and simply,
giving it to the defendant, a result which is not deserved by
either the plaintiffs or the defendants.
Respectfully submitted this

day of June, 1976.

RICHARD RICHARDS
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